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IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Stevenson asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 96 (Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2014) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the order denying his motion for 
credit for time served by holding that credit is only appropriate for periods when the 
defendant is imprisoned, misreads the relevant statutes. The Court of Appeals' 




In 2008, Mr. Stevenson was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, as 
well a sentencing enhancement for use of a deadly (R., pp.27-28.) 
had used a knife in an himself from 
his (L.B.), 
as they approached him in an 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), victims admitted 
they were trying to take Mr. Stevenson's backpack, but asserted they did so in an effort 
to recover some of L.B.'s property, which they said Mr. Stevenson had taken. (PSI, 
p.81.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Stevenson pied guilty to one of the charges of 
aggravated assault and the weapon enhancement. (R., pp.56-57.) The State agreed to 
dismiss the remaining charges and recommend a unified sentence of eight years, with 
two years fixed, to be suspended for a period of probation, which would include local jail 
time as a condition of probation. (R., pp.56-60.) The district court followed that 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"STEVENSON psi." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents 
attached thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, etc.). 
2 
of some 
included of 210 jail, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendment rights, restrictions on Mr. Stevenson's use of his time and 
money, and restrictions on his ability to move (R., pp.76-78.) Mr. Stevenson 
was also advised that credit would not be awarded for the time spent on probation. 
(R., While his performance during that of probation was not perfect, 
Mr. was comply with his probation 
in 1 the filed a probation violation, 
violations occurring between 2010 and 201 (R., pp.106-08.) Mr. Stevenson ultimately 
admitted to being charged with three new misdemeanor offenses and drinking alcohol 
on three different occasions. (See R., pp.107-08, 141.) A mental health evaluation was 
performed following those admissions and Mr. Stevenson was diagnosed as suffering 
from major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder (not otherwise specified). (PSI, 
p.27.) Considering this information, both his probation officer and the presentence 
investigator recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction. (PSI, p.6; R., p.112.) 
The district court followed that recommendation. (R., pp.141-46.) 
Unfortunately, Mr. Stevenson did not perform well during that period of retained 
jurisdiction, as there were several incidents which the staff indicated could have 




two pro se pursuant l.C 
(hereinafter, Rule The first, filed pursuant to Rule 35(b ), requested that the district 
court reconsider his sentence and grant leniency. (R., pp.163-66.) The district court 
denied that motion, pointing to Mr. Stevenson's failures during his periods of probation 
and retained jurisdiction, which it decided demonstrated that the was 
still appropriate. , pp.1 
pursuant and credit 
his had on probation complying with 
terms thereof. (R., pp.177-78.) He contended that credit was appropriate because he 
was subject to numerous restrictive conditions, and thus, his probation was more akin to 
incarceration. (R., pp.177-78.) The district court denied that motion based on 
precedent which held that probationers are not entitled to credit for the time served on 
probation. (R., p.190.) 
Mr. Stevenson filed separate, timely notices of appeal from each of the district 
court's decisions on his Rule 35 motions. (R., pp.195-201.) On appeal, he requested 
that transcripts of five hearings be prepared and augmented into the appellate record. 2 
2 Specifically, he requested the transcripts from the change of plea hearing held on 
March 2, 2009, the sentencing hearing held on April 10, 2009, the admit/deny hearing 
held on March 30, 2012, the dispositional hearing held on May 18, 2012, and the rider 
review hearing held on September 12, 2012. However, he did not pursue his requests 
for the transcripts of the change of plea or admit/deny hearings on appeal. 
4 
in 
in denying in the 
had on probation adhering to the terms thereof; (2) whether this 
erred in denying his motion to augment the record3 ; and (3) whether the 
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a reduction of his sentence. On the 
he plain language of I § 1 revealed that d 
court by denying the was on adhering 
He § 1 provides, as ru it is 
against once is and 
unless and until one of the statutory exceptions to that rule apply. However, he 
contended that, by the plain language of the statutes, those exceptions only apply when 
the person is "temporarily" released from prison and is "at large" during that release. As 
a person on probation adhering to the terms thereof is not temporarily released or at 
large, he contended those exceptions did not apply in his case. 
In regard to the credit issue, the Court of Appeals held that, under its reading of 
the plain language of the credit statutes, only the periods of time the defendant was 
imprisoned were properly awarded as credit. (Opinion, pp.3-4.) Since Mr. Stevenson 
was not incarcerated during the time for which he was claiming credit, the Court of 
3 While the appeal was proceeding, this Court issued its opinion in State v. Easley, 156 
Idaho 214, 218-20 (2014), which addressed several of the issues Mr. Stevenson raised 





on decision in 






in denying the 
a timely petition 
7 
Idaho 
only "when there are special important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion the 
Su pre me Court. I.A. R. 11 B(b ). This 





of discretion is not completely unfettered. 
be considered in evaluating petition 
decision is inconsistent 
Court or United 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own 
prior decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for 
the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; 
I.AR. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Stevenson contends that there are special and important 
reasons for review to be granted. For example, the Court of Appeals' analysis is in 
contravention of Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedent in regard to the 
proper interpretation of statutes, as it fails to give effect to the plain language in the 
credit statutes. I.AR. 118(b )(2)-(3). It also creates discord between the credit statutes 
8 
11 
Mr. contends that Opinion is 
it does not give to the plain in the relevant The 
two statutes issue in this case are § 1 Idaho 




remainder of term commences pronouncement 
and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is 
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned 
thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be computed as 
part of such term. 
l.C. §18-309. This statute addresses credit awards in both pre-judgment and post-
judgment contexts. Mr. Stevenson's claim is for credit for time served post-judgment. 
4 If this Court grants the petition for review, it should grant review as to all issues raised 
in the original briefing. In that case, Mr. Stevenson contends he should be granted relief 
on those issues for the reasons stated in his Appellant's and Reply Briefs, which are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
5 The district court only considered l.C. § 18-309. (R., pp.189-90.) However, as the 
Court of Appeals pointed out, l.C. § 19-2603 is "the more applicable statute in this 
instance" because Mr. Stevenson is claiming credit in regard to a period of probation. 
(See Opinion, p.3 n.1.) Nevertheless, as both statues use similar language in their 
provisions regarding credit awards, that distinction is not relevant to the analysis of this 
issue on appeal. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 870 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(reversing the district court's grant of credit for time served for a period of probation 
based on the language in l.C. § 18-309). Neither statute prevents awards of credit for 
the time the probationer is adhering to the terms of his probation. 
9 
n 1 
I. § 1 
was 
until it 
doing so. § 18-309. Therefore, the remainder Stevenson's of 
imprisonment" commenced on April 10, 2009, which was the his was 
pronounced by district court.6 (R., pp.68-69.) Thus, under general rule forth 
in I. § 18-309, the of which 
of should part of of 
There are a exceptions will from 
accruing credit against his sentence after his sentence has been pronounced. The first 
exception is in l.C. § 18-309 itself: if, after the remainder of the term of imprisonment 
commences, "the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from such 
imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during which he was at large 
must not be computed as part of such term." l.C. § 18-309. However, as release on 
probation is not a "temporary" release, nor is the probationer who is adhering to the 
terms of his probation "at large" during that time he is adhering to the terms of his 
6 In fact, while the execution of Mr. Stevenson's pronounced sentence was ordered 
suspended for a period of probation, Mr. Stevenson was not immediately released from 
custody. He was held until he obtained "written proof of living accommodations for 
clean/sober housing ... [he] can be released upon submission [of that documentation]." 
(R., p.69.) Under the general rule from l.C. §18-309, Mr. Stevenson would be entitled to 
credit for the time he was in custody before being released to probation because he 
began serving his term of imprisonment before he was actually released to probation. 
10 
is 
A from I in 
§ 1 
' it creates for 
at suspended [which] shall counted as a 
of term of " l.C. § 1 that 
exception in l.C. § 18-309, does not apply to the probationer who is adhering to the 
terms of probation because that probationer is not "at large." 
However, the Court of Appeals determined that the critical language in the credit 
statutes, particularly l.C. § 18-309, is the use of the terms "imprisonment" and 
"incarceration," and so, held that a defendant is only entitled to credit for time he was 
imprisoned or incarcerated. (Opinion, pp.3-4.) That interpretation does not give effect 
to the plain language of the other terms in the statutes (such as "at large"), and creates 
discord with other, related statutes, and, as such, is inconsistent with precedent. 
Therefore, this Court should grant review. 7 
7 For these same reasons, Mr. Stevenson also contends that previous decisions which 
have held that credit for time served on probation is not appropriate, see, e.g., 
State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 610 (1992); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 126 (Ct. App. 
11 
a on 
in 1.C. § 1 is 
AND 
821 (2007). phrase "by any legal means is temporarily 
from incarceration" is ordinarily understood to mean "by legal means is 
for a time only from such incarceration." 
The determination of was should 
on time the relevant Cf 
v. 155 Idaho are 
to or d 
Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 315 (2010) (holding that, 
when a term in a contract is unclear, the courts consider "the meaning intended by the 
parties at the time of contracting, not at some future time"). Thus, the appropriate 
question is: at the moment of release, was the release temporary? The answer in 
regard to a release on probation is "no," because there is no associated requirement 
that the defendant ever return to prison. Therefore, the release was not temporary; it 
was designed to release the probationer from incarceration permanently. See, e.g., 
l.C. § 19-2604(1 ). 
1996); Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869-70 (Ct. App. 2008), are manifestly wrong and 
should be overruled to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law, since those previous 
decisions also do not give effect to the plain language of the credit statutes. 
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660 (2000). At any rate, "[t]he interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." State v. Doe, 
140 Idaho 271, 274 (2004). 
12 
if 
the or, to to the 
defendant served in a penal facility prior to the suspension of his 
may then be treated as a misdemeanor. Id. of which option the 
court opts to use, the defendant is free to leave custody and is not required 
again before doing so. id. a term of probation 
as a 
limited time only. 
conclusion hor•f'll-Yl 
or a from 
is to 
grant of a furlough to an inmate. Furloughs are a legal means which permit an 
incarcerated person to be released from that incarceration so he might maintain regular 
employment, schooling, and the like while he serves his sentence. l.C. § 20-242(1 ). 
However, unlike the probationer, the furloughed inmate must return and continue to be 
incarcerated during the time he is not participating in the activity underlying his furlough. 
l.C. §§ 20-242(3), 20-614(3). As a result of the requirement that the furloughed inmate 
return to the place of his incarceration, the furlough release is "for a limited time only" 





u (1 such, 
terminate that period of , it must provide the defendant certain due 
process protections. Id. This makes probation distinctly different from temporary 
like furloughs, since privilege of temporary release may revoked at any 
time by the Department without providing due 
l.C. § Therefore, on probation probationer 
liberty a is 
not 
As probationary release is not temporary, the period during which the defendant 
is on probation does not fall within the conditional scenario under which l.C. § 18-309 
would stop counting credit post-judgment. Therefore, under a proper reading of the 
statute, l.C. § 18-309 does not allow the denial of credit for the period when 
Mr. Stevenson was on probation adhering to the terms thereof. 
8 While furlough may constitute a temporary release, that release does not trigger the 
exception in I .C. § 18-309, such that a furloughed inmate could not receive credit for the 
time he is on furlough. As will be discussed in depth in Section 2, infra, a furloughed 
inmate who is adhering the to the conditions of his furlough is not "at large," and so, the 
second condition needed to deny that inmate credit under l.C. §18-309 would not be 
present. 
14 
l.C. 1 1 when is "9 if 
probationer is not "at large" during a period of time, neither allows the 
district court to deny credit for that of time. 
The Court of Appeals held any person who is released from incarceration is 
for purposes of the (Opinion, (citing v. 1 
1995).) term 
with such, is with 
review. 
The courts are required to and give effect to the Legislature's choice of 
terms. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 
(2011 ). "[T]his Court assumes that the [L]egislature meant what is clearly stated in the 
statute." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). Additionally, where unique terms 
and phrases, such as "at large," have developed specific definitions, the Legislature is 
presumed to have full knowledge of that specific definition. See Robison v. Bateman-
Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212 (2003) (discussing a situation where jurisprudence 
expanded the definition of the term in question beyond a common-usage definition for 
9 Idaho Code § 18-309 provides that only "the time during which he was at large must 
not be computed as part of such term [of imprisonment]." l.C. § 18-309 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, l.C. § 19-2603 provides: "[T]he time such person shall have been at 
large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of the term of his 
sentence." l.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added). 
15 
is 
to use term "at 
terms, such as "released on probation" or 
had the Legislature intended to deprive a 
which he was released on probation, it could 








not to use 
from incarceration." For example, 
of credit for the entire period during 
written l.C. §19-2603 as follows: "the 
the terms 
not be counted 
that in ! § 
§ 
"must serve out 
the sentence, and the time during which such prisoner was out on parole shall not be 
deemed part thereof, unless the commission, in its discretion, shall determine 
otherwise." l.C. § 20-228 (emphasis added). By not drafting l.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-
2603 in the same way as l.C. § 20-228, the Legislature demonstrated that the term "at 
large" does not equate to the whole term of probation or release from incarceration. 
Therefore, the Opinion, which effectively substitutes new terms for the terms actually 
used by the Legislature, is erroneous. 
The meaning of this different, narrower phrase - "at large" - is best understood 
by referring to the illustrative definition of the term, which reads: "<the suspect is still at 
large>." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 52. This example refers to a situation where the 
person is not in custody, but rather, is evading capture and at a location unknown to 
16 
In 1 
should [not] rd his 
" re 
In similar 
of credit deny the award for three days, into account the three days 
that [the defendant] was at large following his G'"'''L"J'G" Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho 
171, 172 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added). such, the term "at large" does not 
broadly apply all situations where the , but rather, only to 
he is in custody and his 
In the of probation, 
. The Court long recognized 
that, "by virtue of their status alone, probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to 
which every citizen is entitled, justifying the impos[ition] [of] reasonable conditions that 
deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens." 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). It has also recognized that probation is like incarceration, in that it is a 
punishment imposed by the justice system, and like other forms of punishment, restricts 
the person's freedoms. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001). As a 
result, probationers who have not absconded supervision, by definition, are not free, 
unrestrained, or not under control, and thus, do not fall under the plain, ordinary 
definition of the term "at large." 
17 
rt of Appeals 
since 
and reconcile the 
narrow u 
18-309 and 1 in 
controlling it for time 
are duty-bound, when construing 
scheme whenever possible. Dept. of 
v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 104 (2004); State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 
(Ct. App. 2010). 
For example, an who is a furlough is temporarily 
by if large" is 





during the he is on furlough he would during 
that time. See l.C. § 18-309 ("if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal 
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned 
thereto, the time during which he was at large [read: released] must not be computed as 
part of such term"). Such a result is directly contrary to the purpose of the furlough 
statute, which was enacted to provide an incarcerated person the opportunity to serve 
his sentence (i.e., get credit against his sentence) while simultaneously being 
released from incarceration in order to continue his employment or education. See 
l.C. § 20-242(1 )-(2). The Court of Appeals' reading of l.C. § 18-309 - that credit is only 
properly awarded for time spent while incarcerated - prevents that from being a 
possibility. However, if "at large" is given its proper, narrow definition, then 
I .C. §§ 18 309 and 20-242 may be read harmoniously, because if the furloughed inmate 
18 
rn 
puts I in 
conflict. the Court interpretation, I. §18-309 credit 
not" be given for any period of post-judgment time that the defendant is not 
incarcerated. 10 That makes l.C. § 18-309 diametrically opposed to I § 20-228, which 
allows the parole board, in discretion, to grant credit for post-judgment time that the 
defendant is not is released on narrower reading 
of would allow statutes of 
the probationer supervision, as the 
board chooses to exercise its discretion). Therefore, since reading "at large" in the 
broad manner the Court of Appeals did creates discord within the statutory scheme and 
a harmonizing interpretation is possible, the discordant interpretation should be 
rejected. See Housel, 140 Idaho at 104; Gamino, 148 Idaho at 829. 
The second rationale for the narrower interpretation of the term "at large" is 
related to the first, since it also arises from the fact that the Legislature has, for the last 
sixteen years, provided that parolees are able to receive credit for the time during which 
they are released from incarceration pursuant to the terms of their parole. l.C. § 20-
228; 1998 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 327, § 2, p.1057 (amending the statute to allow for 
10 The use of the term "must" means the statutory provision is mandatory; the courts 
have no discretion to ignore its directive. See, e.g., Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848 
(1995) (explaining the difference between mandatory and permissive language in 
statutory provisions). 
19 
The incongruity of maintaining such a distinction was criticized by Judge 
soon the made in the parole "If a 
now to for time spent on 
how much sense it to give a 
[sic] it for while as a condition of 
probation?" State v. Jakoski, 132 Idaho 67, 69 (Ct. App. 1998) (Schwartzman, Judge, 
specially concurring) (emphasis in original). While Judge Schwartzman was particularly 
focused on the denial of credit for the time the probationer served in a county jail as a 
condition of probation, his criticism is applicable beyond that particular scenario: it is 
nonsensical and improper to allow credit for parolees who adhere to the terms of their 
parole, but not credit probationers who adhere to the terms of their probation (which 
11 Of particular note in this comparison is the fact that l.C. § 20-228 provides "[f]rom and 
after the issuance of the warrant and suspension of the parole of any convicted person 
and until arrest, the parolee shall be considered a fugitive from justice." l.C. § 20-228. 
This corresponds with the prohibition against the award of credit for time that the 
defendant is "at large" (i.e., a fugitive). See l.C. §§ 18-309, 19-2603; BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY, 52. Despite the "fugitive from justice" provision, l.C. § 20-228 
immediately goes on to provide that the parole commission may grant credit for the time 
which the parolee served on parole. I .C. § 20-228. Therefore, a similar interpretation of 
I .C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 is also reasonable. 
20 
in 
as a whole. 
It is clear that was not during of probation 
adhering to the terms conditions thereof since he was not or unrestrained. He 
was to at least different "special conditions" was on probation. 
(R., pp.76-78.) One of was that he serve 210 Ada County Jail. 12 
, pp.76-77.) He was controlled, in that he was to maintain full-time 
(R., ) 
any probation 
77-78.) His right to privacy was to his 
Fourth Amendment constitutional rights regarding searches of his person and property. 
(R., p.77.) He was also required to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self 
incrimination, as he was required to truthfully answer all questions of his probation 
officer related to the terms of his probation. (R., p.77.) He was even required to waive 
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation at any subsequent hearing in regard to his 
probation. (R., p.77.) 
12 The district court awarded Mr. Stevenson credit against the period of discretionary 
time for 160 days previously served, leaving him with fifty days that he could be required 
to serve. (R., p.76.) Mr. Stevenson was also not immediately released to probation, 
though his motion for early release in that regard was granted. (R., pp.69, 89.) 
Therefore, the fact that Mr. Stevenson was still actually physically confined in a penal 
facility for part of the term of his probation invokes Judge Schwartzman's specific 





his absence from the state was approved by his probation officer. (R., p.78.) Thus, 
given these numerous restraints on Mr. Stevenson, it cannot be said that he was "free, 
unrestrained, or not under control," and therefore, it cannot be said that he was 
during his period of probation. 
Mr. 
on to 
no of violation filed on 
April 24, 2009, and the probable cause form filed on March 201 based on an 
agent's warrant).) During that time, Mr. Stevenson lived under those restrictions to his 
rights and restraints to his freedom. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. As such, he was not 
free, unrestrained, or not under control due to the terms of his probation. This is true 
even though the report of violation that was filed in 2012 indicates he was not fully 
successful at all times during that three-year period. (See R., pp.106-08.) None of 
those alleged violations are based on his absconding from supervision.13 (See 
13 Mr. Stevenson does recognize that one of the allegations that he admitted was that 
he had committed the crime of Failure to Appear. (R., p.107.) However, that allegation 
does not indicate that he had absconded supervision or that his probation officer did not 
know where he was; rather, it only indicates that he missed a court appearance. (See 
R., pp.107, 110.) And even if that is sufficient to determine he was "at large," the record 
demonstrates that he would have been at large for a total of twenty-one days, as he 
22 
Thus, 
of scenario in a 
probationer may denied credit is if he from 
supervision. Therefore, giving all the terms common meanings, the statutes are 
properly interpreted to read, "the person shall have been large [read: 
under suspended shall not as term of 
" I § 1 
during which he of the 
and numerous and on his 
freedom was improper. 
C. The Statute Is, At Least, Ambiguous, And The Rule Of Lenity Requires That 
Ambiguity Be Resolved In Mr. Stevenson's Favor 
To the extent that there are multiple, rational interpretations of the terms in the 
credit statutes, specifically in regard to the terms "at large" and "temporarily released," 
the statutes are, at least, ambiguous as to whether credit should be given for time spent 
in the custody of the Department of Correction adhering to all the restrictive terms of 
probation. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. In such an instance, the rule of lenity 
requires the ambiguity to be resolved in Mr. Stevenson's favor. See, e.g., 
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2007). In this case, that would mean that 
turned himself into authorities on September 20, 2011. (R., p.110.) Thus, even in that 









access to the 
to 
rt in 
Gou rt rc,\/Or'0 
this case lation 
transcripts 
his as it appropriate, or alternatively, remand the case for a reduction 
of sentence pursuant to l.C.R. 35. 
DATED this 161h day of December, 2014. 
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